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Abstract
I start with mathematical Platonism, an ancient stream of thought that views numbers as transcend-
ing physical reality. I join this to recent insights into mathematical randomness from theoretical
computer science. Joining these streams – one ancient, one recent – yields the surprising conclu-
sion that randomness, defined in a particular way, is part of the nature of God. I then explore some
of the implications of this conclusion for our understanding of the doctrine of God’s infinitude.
Computer scientists approach randomness via random numbers rather than random events. But the term
“random number” is not the same as that used by experimenters for whom a random number is one generated
by a process that makes any of a collection of numbers equally likely, as occurs when tossing a single die.
Rather, computer scientists take a single number and ask if it is random. In the binary, “base 2,” language
used in computers, where “1” and “0” are the only options, all numbers are strings of 1’s and 0’s. Consider,
for example, the numbers .1010101010101010 . . . and .01111110011110110111. Intuitively, the latter seems
more random since predicting the next digit appears impossible. (The latter number was, in fact, generated
by flipping a coin, which confirms that the next digit would be unpredictable.) Computer scientists ask what
“random” means for such numbers.
The first attempt to formulate a concept of randomness for sequences of numbers was by Richard Von Mises
in 1919. This approach starts with the idea that for a random number written in binary, each consecutive bit
should be equally likely to be a 0 or a 1. This means that as we look at increasing numbers of bits, the bits
will come closer to being half 0’s and half 1’s – this is called the law of large numbers. However, there are
strings – .10101010101010101010 . . ., for example – that satisfy the law of large numbers (being half 1’s and
half 0’s) but are not random. So Von Mises focused on substrings. If one picks the substring found in positions
{1, 3, 5, . . .} of .10101010101010101010 . . . one gets the string .111111 . . ., which is clearly not half 0’s and
half 1’s. This, according to Von Mises, shows that .10101010101010101010 . . . is not random. He then calls
any selection process that can be described by a rule like “look at every other bit” an “acceptable selection
rule.” He then says that a random number is one for which all substrings selected by acceptable selection rules
satisfy the law of large numbers. This was a good start to defining randomness for numbers but it didn’t solve
the problem because it provided no way to decide which rules were acceptable.
In 1936, Alan Turing (1912-1954) defined what has today come to be known as a Turing machine. Turing’s
goal was to develop an abstract, unambiguous formalization of the process of evaluating a mathematical func-
tion (such as x2 + 2x + 1). While not a physical machine, Turing’s “machine” was a careful description of a
∗This contribution is an excerpt from the paper, “Random Numbers and God’s Nature” by James Bradley. The complete
paper will be available in the book Abraham’s Dice, edited by Karl W. Giberson, Oxford University Press, forthcoming Spring
2016.
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step-by-step process, what we commonly call an “algorithm.”1 Turing’s concept heavily influenced the devel-
opment of actual computing machines that took place in the decade following. Mathematicians and computer
scientists generally regard Turing’s efforts as successful; the “Church-Turing thesis” named for Alonzo Church
(1903-1995) and Turing asserts that any operation that can be carried out on an actual computer can (at least
in principle) be carried out on a Turing machine. Thus Turing machines provide an abstract setting in which
one can ask and answer theoretical questions about what computers in principle can and cannot do. Von Mises
wrote before the concept of Turing machine had been defined. Its introduction made it possible to say which
selection rules are acceptable, namely the ones that can be formulated as a Turing machine.
Starting with the work of Per Martin-Löf in 1966, computer scientists have formulated a detailed theory of
randomness for numbers; the theory extensively uses Turing machines. It includes numerous definitions of
what it means for a number to be random, for what it means for one number to be more random than another,
and many other nuances. The features of this theory that are of the most interest to us here, however, are:
1. Three definitions of “random” that have been shown to be equivalent;
2. The fact that using these equivalent definitions, it can be shown that, in a mathematically precise sense,
almost all numbers are random.
The definitions are intuitively appealing and can be made mathematically rigorous – and when mathemati-
cians formulate a concept in more than one intuitively appealing way and the definitions are subsequently shown
to be equivalent, it reinforces the belief that they have successfully captured a significant idea. What follows is
a brief, intuitive explanation of each concept; a more technical explanation can be found in the appendix. The
three concepts are:
Irreducibility
Consider two bit strings: 10101010101010101010 and 01111110011110110111. The first has an obvious
pattern; the second was generated by flipping a coin 20 times. The first can be generated by this algorithm:
Repeat 10 times: output ‘10’
The second, however, requires an algorithm like
Output ‘01111110011110110111’
That is, the second string cannot be reduced to one shorter and simpler than itself. The underlying intuition is
that a string of n bits is random if any algorithm able to generate it requires at least n bits, i.e., the string is
irreducible. Infinite strings are random if they cannot be reduced to finite expression.
Martin-Löf randomness
A string like 10101010101010101010 has an obvious pattern; a string like 01111110011110110111 does not.
Of course, a string could look like it has a pattern near its beginning but then become patternless. Martin-Löf
randomness captures the idea that a string which is not random has a finite pattern and maintains that pattern
throughout a possibly infinite length. A random string is one that lacks a pattern.
Constructive martingales
Suppose a string of bits is revealed one bit at a time. The intuitive idea behind the martingale concept of
randomness is that there is no betting strategy that would enable one to profit by predicting the next bit. That
is, randomness defined in this way corresponds in a meaningful way with unpredictability.
1A precise definition can be found on the internet or in any introductory text on computing theory.
2015 ACMS PROCEEDINGS 21
So, the underlying intuition behind these three concepts of random number is that a number is random if it
is irreducibly infinite, has no finite pattern, and is unpredictable. The key point for us in this paper, however, is
that random numbers are numbers. Thus:
If numbers have indeed existed in the mind of God from eternity, randomness is and always has
been part of God’s nature.
I will explore the theological implications of this idea in the next section and the scientific implications in
the section following that.
Theological implications
What does the idea that randomness is part of God’s nature tell us about God?
First, let’s consider what it does not tell us. The popular concept cited above is that randomness means not
having a governing design, method, or purpose; without order; without cause. This popular concept is what
makes the idea that randomness might be part of the divine nature seem strange or shocking. But algorithmic
randomness is quite different from the popular concept of randomness and is informative about God’s nature –
even under a Christian theology which has always affirmed that God has designed the world, acts with method
and purpose, and is orderly. Unlike popular notions of randomness, under the mathematical hypothesis of
numbers being ideas in God’s mind, the properties of random numbers are necessary properties of God’s nature2
and can enrich our understanding of God’s infinitude. Before we can see what these properties add, though, we
need to see how systematic theologians have historically understood divine infinitude. Here is a typical list of
divine attributes [3, pp. 36-37] to provide a context for the analysis that follows:
The Nature of God










2Note that this analysis does not simply give analogies taken from nature; rather it provides propositions that are necessary truths
about God, subject to the limits of human language.
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The Character of God









In this taxonomy, infinity is one aspect of God’s sufficiency; however, Christian thinkers’ understanding of
God’s infinitude has varied over time and across religious traditions. The notion that God is infinite seems to
have first appeared in Christian writings among early Gnostics. Augustine wrote that God is infinite in wisdom
and is unbounded not in the sense of being suffused throughout space, but rather God is infinite “in another way”
although he did not comment on what this way is [1]. Thomas Aquinas devoted Question Seven of the first part
of his Summa Theologica to God’s infinitude. He conceives of it as meaning that God is not limited in any
way and is infinite in perfection in the sense that God’s perfection cannot be diminished or increased. He wrote
that God is unique in being infinite, that no bodily thing can be infinite, and there cannot be an actually infinite
number. This latter notion originated in Aristotle’s idea of “potential infinity” – for example, integers increasing
without bound but not reaching a limit.3 Some medieval scholars distinguished extrinsic and intrinsic infinity.
The concept of “extrinsic infinity” was based on the integers continuing without limit; “intrinsic infinity” was
based on the notion of a finite space being infinitely divisible. They suggested that God’s infinitude is intrinsic
not extrinsic; this seems to be a way to affirm God’s infinitude while avoiding the notion that God is infinite
in extent – but this was ambiguous about the relationship of intrinsic infinitude to God’s nature. John Calvin’s
concept of God’s infinitude was “beyond our senses.” Many theologians have pointed out that God’s infinitude
is not separable from other attributes – it is part of what it means for God to be omniscient, omnipresent, and
omnipotent. Some pointed out that God’s infinitude, when applied to time, is God’s eternality; when applied to
space, is God’s omnipresence. Herman Bavinck emphasized that God’s infinitude applies to character attributes
as well as sufficiency and majesty and in this way is quite different from a quantitative notion of infinity [2,
pp. 159-160]. The principal common theme, however, that runs through these notions is “without limit.” And
the etymological basis of infinity is ‘unlimited.’
I can see two ways that the idea of divine randomness can enrich our understanding of God’s infinitude: (1)
it can serve a pedagogical role by providing images that enable us to form clearer concepts of divine infinitude,
thereby enriching our worship and (2) it can introduce aspects of divine infinitude that had not been previously
noted.
3Following the work of Georg Cantor, mathematicians today would say that Aquinas was incorrect. Not only are there actually
infinite numbers, there are infinitely many of them of infinitely many different sizes. For Aristotle, numbers were quantitative aspects
of physical things. Aquinas seems to have used this Aristotelian concept in saying there cannot be an actually infinite number, although
he does not explicitly mention Aristotle when he says this. This is one place where Christian Platonism enjoys a decided advantage
over Aristotelianism. Seeing numbers as ideas in God’s mind removes the conflict Aquinas saw between God being uniquely infinite
and there being actually infinite numbers – actually infinite numbers can exist because they participate in the divine infinitude. For a
discussion of Cantor’s work and its theological implications, see [4].
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(1) The integers provide an image that many theologians have used to illustrate God’s infinitude. The con-
cepts of randomness discussed here follow in that tradition – an infinite number that is irreducibly random
is one that cannot be described by repetition of a finite string; a Martin-Löf random number lacks a pat-
tern that can be generated by any (necessarily finite) algorithm. Both of these concepts provide images
of the idea that God cannot be described in terms of any finite thing – no complete description of God is
possible.
(2) The martingale definition of randomness introduces an aspect of the divine nature that I have not seen
discussed in connection with the doctrine of divine infinitude, namely the element of surprise or mystery.
Random numbers are mysterious, such that no matter how many bits of one have been revealed, the next
bit is still unpredictable. Saying that such numbers exist in the mind of God provides an image of the
idea that one may indeed understand aspects of God truly and may learn more, but never come to the
point where there are not further aspects of God that are surprising. Put differently, no matter how much
knowledge one has of God, God’s mystery remains unfathomable.4
In summary, discussions of divine infinitude that are informed primarily by the image of the integers lead
one to the idea that God is unlimited, but not much more. A comprehension of divine randomness extends this
understanding, nuances it, and enriches it.
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